The Legal Future of College Athletics after the House Settlement: Part 1

As any university president, athletic director or even casual fan will tell you, the world of college athletics has changed dramatically over the last several years. With the ever-evolving name, image and likeness (NIL) landscape, even more changes appear to be on the horizon. Accordingly, it is important for everyone, from NIL collectives, to universities, to student-athletes themselves to be aware of these changes.

This is part one of a two-part series examining the legal restructuring of college athletics following the House settlement. First, let’s explore the settlement framework and the emerging authority of the College Sports Commission.

The House Settlement

In June 2025, Judge Claudia Wilken of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California approved the landmark settlement in the House v. NCAA (“House”) antitrust class action suit. The class members alleged that NCAA scholarship limits and the NCAA rules restricting student athletes’ ability to receive compensation from third-parties, schools and conferences violated the Sherman Act because the rules were anti-competitive restraints on trade.

For purposes of this article, injunctive relief under House contained two landscape-altering provisions: (1) it held that the NCAA may prohibit NIL payments to student athletes by a limited set of associated entities or individuals, however, the NCAA may not prohibit NIL payments by other third parties; and (2) schools that opt in to the settlement can provide additional direct benefits and compensation to athletes that is worth up to 22% of the Power Four conference schools’ average athletic revenue each year, with yearly increases. This year (2025-2026) the cap for this payment is $20 million, but it increases each year over the ten-year term of the agreement and is projected to reach $32.9 million in 2034-2035. The cap, however, only includes direct payments from schools and does not include an athlete’s third-party NIL deals.

The Power Four conferences also established a new legal entity called the College Sports Commission, which is now responsible for enforcing the settlement provisions related to direct payment and third-party NIL agreements.

The College Sports Commission

After the House settlement, the College Sports Commission drafted and distributed a “University Participation Agreement” in November 2025. The College Sports Commission intended this agreement to bind schools to its oversight and give it the legal authority to enforce its decisions. However, the agreement still lacks signatures from enough universities for the College Sports Commission to implement it. Furthermore, multiple attorneys general have criticized the agreement.

On December 3, 2025, Ohio Attorney General, Dave Yost, co-authored a letter, along with the attorneys general of Tennessee, Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia, to the CEO of the College Sports Commission and the Commissioners of the Power Four conferences.

In the letter, the attorneys general stated that “the agreement completely misses the mark” and that “the College Sports Commission’s blunt-force approach will only create additional complications that will further convolute the college athletics landscape.” The attorneys general specifically took issue with Section 28 of the agreement, which authorizes the College Sports Commission to strip schools of all conference revenue and impose postseason bans if any state, state official, student-athlete, “associated entity,” or other third-party brings litigation “related in any way” to College Sports Commission rules, investigations or enforcement.

The state attorneys general noted that, under this provision, “a public university could face financial devastation and competitive exclusion not because of its own conduct, but because a State Attorney General exercises independent sovereign authority to investigate illegal conduct, or because a student athlete exercises legal rights, or because a booster or NIL collective files suit independently to vindicate their lawful interests.”

Among other concerns, the attorneys general noted that the agreement creates an enforcement system lacking transparency, due process and other legal safeguards by requiring institutions to immediately suspend employees whom the College Sports Commission concludes have failed to promptly cooperate with an investigation without any independent review, by requiring schools to amend agreements with third parties – such as NIL collectives – to require those third parties to cooperate fully with College Sports Commission investigations, and by holding institutions accountable for violations committed by student-athletes, representatives, and “associated entities,” regardless of an institution’s ability to supervise these actors.

Given the breadth of their concerns, the state attorneys general asked that the College Sports Commission take the following immediate steps: (1) suspend all signature deadlines associated with the agreement, (2) withdraw or materially revise the provisions outlined in the letter, (3) engage directly with member institutions and states before any redrafted agreement is circulated, (4) provide transparency, due process and meaningful oversight of discretion in any future enforcement framework, and (5) eliminate provisions penalizing institutions for actions by states or independent third parties.

Whether the College Sports Commission ultimately secures the authority it seeks remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the House settlement did not end the legal evolution of college athletics – it accelerated it. As enforcement begins and universities confront difficult compliance decisions, the practical implications of this new framework are only now coming into focus. In part two, I will explore enforcement, risk and what universities and collectives should expect next.